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Messrs. Kolbe and Tye perform an important service in their critique' of
Duquesne Light & Power Co. v. Barasch.2 Especially valuable is their explo-
ration of the two different types of risk faced by a regulated utility-first, the
risk of being unable to recover its investment in a plant, no matter how
prudently incurred, and second, the risk of retroactive changes in the
regulatory policy. The second risk appears to be far more of a problem. As
Kolbe and Tye point out, it engenders a peculiar type of instability. If the risk
is reflected in a higher cost of capital, as it should be, regulators may feel
bound to exercise the freedom of maneuver for which ratepayers will have
paid.'
I have some doubt, however, whether the Pennsylvania rule's apparent
asymmetry creates as great difficulties as they project, apart from the rule's
retroactive application. Their analysis builds on the premise that a bondholder's
promised rate of return represents the upper bound on the rate he or she will
ultimately realize4 and that the bondholder's rate of return is necessarily lower
than the promised rate.' They regard the regulatory practice of using the
bondholders' promised rate of return as the cost of debt capital as necessary
to permit the bondholders to realize the expected rate.' They then extend that
analysis from debt to equity, arguing that, in the presence of asymmetric risk,
regulators must similarly include a premium above the cost of equity capital.7
I believe they have identified a problem in articulating the allowable rate of
return, but perhaps a soluble one.
To examine the theory, we may start by considering a semi-practical
example. Suppose a regulatory agency employed the now-rare "comparable
earnings" method for estimating cost of capital and found an unregulated
industry with a risk profile similar to that of a specific utility. For simplicity's
sake, assume that in this industry (widget manufacturing, as always) each year
19 out of every 20 firms generate profits averaging 15%, while the 20th goes
bankrupt in a total loss. The regulators believe the utility faces a parallel 5 %
risk (1 in 20) that its plant may not prove used and useful. Should they allow
tJudge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. I am indebted to Messrs.
Kolbe and Tye for their comments on an earlier draft.
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the utility 15% on plant that proves used and useful (and thus enters the rate
base), or a lower figure, adjusted. down from 15% by averaging in the total
loss?
The classic definition of the cost of capital-"expected rate of return...
on alternative investments of equivalent risk"-may seem to require the lower
figure. The expected return ex ante in the widget industry is clearly less than
15 %. But, as Kolbe and Tye make clear, if utilities are allowed only the lesser
figure when they 'succeed, i.e., when they make it past the "used and useful"
post, they will be markedly less attractive investments than widget makers. By
contrast, if utilities are allowed 15% when they manage to get their plant
included, utility returns will track those in the widget industry.
Does the latter solution fit the principle underlying the standard definition
of the cost of capital? I would suggest it does. The return that the utility is in
fact being allowed under this approach includes two components: the 15%
allowed if the plant proves "used and useful," and the total non-recovery if
it does not. The average is the expected rate of return on alternative invest-
ments of equivalent risk, i.e., the average enjoyed in the widget industry.
If I am right here, two consequences follow: First, the principle of looking
to the "expected return on alternative investments of equivalent risk" is sound,
but only if the regulators recognize the parallel rate base that they are address-
ing. Thus, if the regulators exclude plant from rate base under the used and
useful doctrine, they should look only to expected returns for successful firms
in a comparable industry (if using the comparable earnings method). Second,
the comparable earnings method can be used to obtain the appropriate figure,
though of course it presents the daunting challenge of estimating the risk of
total loss for the utility and for the control group, as well as independent
problems of its own.'
Whether the discounted cash flow (DCF) method can handle the problem
is another matter. Certainly the risk of total loss does not fit with the assump-
tion of steady dividend growth that is evidently 'used in its practical
application,'" though not in its underlying theory. And it may well be that
the circularity implicit in the DCF method-the price of the utility's stock is
a key term, but it depends on investors' expectations of how the regulators
themselves will act-becomes fatal when risk of disaster becomes non-trivial.
Given these practical difficulties, the theoretical point identified by Kolbe and
Tye may be lost in the noise.
If Kolbe and Tye are correct that regulatory calculations of the cost of
equity capital cannot handle asymmetric risk, some special remedy may be
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needed to enable utilities to attract capital for construction of risky plants. If
risky plants are not constructed, and if energy demand is volatile, there will
be at least short-term energy shortages, for capacity that is just enough for
demand that is 100% certain will not be enough for the expected demand (i.e.,
the average of estimated demands, weighted according to probability). If
regulators simply prescribed an artificial regulatory risk premium for a new
rate base, the premium itself would elicit investment in somewhat risky
plants-the higher the premium, the riskier the plants that would be feasible
investments. 1 If instead regulation stifles all construction of risky plants, the
likely result will be cries that private industry is unable to supply electricity,
and pressure for the state-which need not fret over whether its investments
will earn a return equivalent to competing alternatives-to do it.
Kolbe and Tye dispute the Supreme Court's methodology for determining
what sort of retroactive change may qualify as "slight" and thus be constitu-
tionally permissible. 12 Their first attack seems to me to go astray. That aggre-
gate losses from canceled nuclear plants may reach $30 billion does not
increase Duquesne's loss or make Pennsylvania's conduct more reprehensible.
If the Supreme Court's notion of "slight" is not otherwise defective, it merely
suggests the likelihood that other firms may win relief under Duquesne.
Far more powerful is the argument that the Court should have considered
the loss as a proportion of the shareholders' portion of the rate base, not its
entirety. The shareholders will in all probability bear the entire direct loss-the
reduction in earnings due to the denial of any recovery for the abandoned
plant. But in defense of the Court one should recognize that by increasing
perceived regulatory risk, Pennsylvania's retroactive shift must also have
reduced the security of Duquesne's bonds and thus their capital value. That
portion of the loss cannot also have fallen on shareholders. After Duquesne,
the firm's previously issued bonds will still carry their old interest rate, a rate
lower than that necessary to attract debt capital under the newly revealed risk
levels; thus shareholders' claims on earnings will, after the decision, be greater
than they would have been if the firm had had to issue the bonds in a market
aware of the higher regulatory risk. However, as the Court purported to be
speaking only of the direct loss, 3 Kolbe and Tye's criticism is on the mark.
The consolation here is that the parties never really joined issue on choice
of the proper denominator in a comparative test. Duquesne understandably
responded to Pennsylvania's analysis of the scope of the loss with a complete
rejection of any comparative standard, arguing that such a standard would
11. Cf. King v. Palmer, 906 F.2d 762, 769-70 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concurring opinion) (offering similar
analysis of enhancements for contingency under fee-shifting statutes).
12. Kolbe & Tye, supra note 1, at 148-50.
13. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 310-12.
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effectively apply one rule to small companies and another to large ones."
Thus, the matter evidently remains open.
It may be hard to draw the line between the "petty larceny" 5 of slight
changes and the grand larceny of drastic ones, especially as "[m]any small
losses could add up to a large one in a hurry," 6 but the alternatives are also
troubling. Jurisdictions constantly experiment with regulatory change-adopting
"CWIP" over "AFUDC," 17 "normalization" over "flowthrough," etc.-and
we should rejoice that they do. A judicial requirement of compensation for
every adverse change, no matter how slight, would freeze the system. While
one can imagine a regime in which the state pays for all adverse changes and
recovers for all favorable ones, the computation costs would likely block most
change. Even though purely prospective changes would not be affected, I
suspect they would often represent an awkward device for regulatory adjust-
ments, as they would require continual vintaging of assets. Supreme Court
imposition of a single solution on the entire country is worse, as the courts'
sad experience with Smyth v. Amess indicates. If there is a clearly preferable
solution-and a revived fair value rule, relying on the value of a plant's output
in a decontrolled bulk power market, may fit the bill'-a requirement of
compensation for non-"slight" retroactive changes may provide enough incen-
tive for most or all states to adopt this rule.
I cannot resist the temptation to propose a research program. Assuming
there are jurisdictions where regulatory risk has been comparatively stable over
several years, it should be possible to compare the cost of capital in these
relatively "safe" jurisdictions, that is, ones that follow the prudent investment
rule and allow CWIP and normalization, with the cost of capital in jurisdictions
that force higher risks on utilities. Of course, the allowed cost of equity capital
is a function of the regulators' decisions, so it would be necessary to use some
more objective, external gauge. One possibility would be interest rates on
newly issued bonds, though the effects here must be muted by the bondholders'
relatively secure position.
Second, what of volatility in regulatory treatment? Can the cost of this be
segregated? Jurisdictions that make adverse retroactive changes in regulation
must increase the cost of utilities' capital, and thereby their citizens' rates.
How large are these increases, particularly in comparison to the ratepayers'
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short-term gains? If there were evidence that jurisdictions engaging in de facto
but not de jure wealth confiscations pay in full for their self-indulgence,2"
states would presumably take heed.
20. See Kolbe & Tye, supra note 1, at 144 n.96.

